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Privatisation has begun to accelerate in India and Pakistan. However, it is not clear 
that a change in ownership per se will contribute significantly to a more rapid, efficient, 
and equitable growth unless policies that ensure competition for these enterprises and 
remove distortions in factor markets also are undertaken at the same time or prior to 
privatisation. After a brief discussion of the transition from state-led development to more 
market-oriented policies and gradual opening to world markets, this paper reviews some 
of the analytical literature on privatisation and regulation. The translation of these 
theories into concrete policy suggestions is difficult for countries such as Pakistan and 
India, where many of the assumptions behind the theories do not hold. However, the 
results of empirical studies on past privatisations around the world do hold lessons for 
South Asia. Similarly, theories of regulation offer only broad recommendations, most 
notably (for South Asia) that regulation is not the best way to redistribute resources. The 
final section of the paper reviews India’s and Pakistan’s experience with privatisation 
thus far. Attempted privatisation of electricity in India serves as an example of the need 
for more attention to regulation, while the transfer of ownership has led to better service 
at lower cost in the telecommunications sector. Pakistan’s privatisation programme 
appears to have had similarly mixed results, though it is difficult to come to firm 
conclusions with the evidence at hand. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a great honour to be invited to deliver the Mahbub ul Haq Memorial 
Lecture.  Mahbub finished his graduate studies in economics and left Yale in 1956, a 
year before I began my own graduate studies there.  He had set an exemplary record 
that those of us from South Asia who followed him at Yale, such as Bashir Karamali, 
Parvez Hasan, Syed Nawab Hyder Naqvi, Syed Naseem, and myself included, could 
only envy.  In the late seventies, I interacted with Mahbub at the World Bank, where 
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I spent three years at the Development Research Centre.  I still recall our discussions 
at the Bank about the Basic Needs Approach to economic development.  As the 
Special Adviser to the UNDP Administrator, he pioneered the concept of Human 
Development and developed the Human Development Index (HDI).  We resumed 
our discussions, this time on  the conceptual and measurement issues related to HDI.  
Our debates were always friendly, and even though we strongly differed on 
development strategies, we were united in our belief that eradication of abject 
poverty and enabling each individual to achieve a fuller and richer life according to 
his or her own lights have to be the overarching objectives of any development 
strategy.  The world of economics, and we in South Asia, lost a beacon of light, and 
a source of fresh ideas and innovations, when he was snatched away from us.  Let 
me take this opportunity to pay tribute to his wife Bani, who is not only valiantly and 
successfully carrying on his legacy, but also contributing in her own right to 
furthering economic and social development of South Asia. 
 
1.1  Economic Reforms:  Background 
When countries of South Asia became independent after the end of the Second 
World War, to varying degrees they adopted an inward-oriented development 
strategy that emphasised import-substituting industrialisation and accorded a 
dominant role to the state in the articulation and implementation of the strategy.  This 
was natural, given that leaders of the independence movement identified the colonial 
regime of economic management with laissez-faire capitalism, and viewed its liberal 
foreign trade policy as driven primarily by considerations of generating exportable 
surpluses of primary commodities and ensuring that the markets in the colonies were 
accessible without significant barriers to imports of manufacturing from metropolitan 
countries.  They believed that investment by the colonial regime, in what used to be 
called social overhead capital, namely in transportation and communication 
networks, was essentially driven by considerations of reducing costs of exports.   
Above all, they faulted  the colonial regime for not investing adequately in social 
sectors of education and health.  The fact that many of the leaders of India and 
Pakistan after independence were Fabian socialists contributed in no small measure 
to their distrust of markets and emphasis on a dominant role for the state in the 
economy. 
It is nevertheless a fact that, even without significant tariff or non-tariff 
barriers to protect them, substantial  industrial capacity was created in pre-partition 
India in the late 19th century and between the two World Wars.  A number of 
indigenous, family-based and fairly large-sized, industrial conglomerates had 
emerged and controlled a large share of domestic industrial output.  In other words, 
an entrepreneurial class existed at the time of independence which could have 
spearheaded development.  Still the then prevailing basic distrust of the market, and 
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belief that the massive task of economic development was beyond the capacity of 
private entrepreneurs, led to the state assuming a dominant role in the economy.  
However, the extent of insulation from foreign trade and the dominance of the state 
varied across South Asia, these being the highest in India followed by Pakistan. 
The performance of this development strategy, until it came to be 
significantly modified by a wave of economic liberalisation and reduction of trade 
barriers in the late eighties and nineties, is decidedly mixed.  In India, the overall 
average annual rate of real GDP growth from the 1950s to the beginning of 1980s 
was an extremely modest 3.75 percent, famously described as the “Hindu” rate of 
growth by the distinguished economist, the late Raj Krishna.  In Pakistan, in part 
because the industrial base was small at independence, growth was faster.  Starting 
from a slow 3.3 percent per annum in the 1950s as in India, it accelerated to 6.7 
percent in the 1960s  and remained generally close to 6 percent until the early 
1990s [Hasan (1998), p. 24]. In both economies a diversified, though internationally 
uncompetitive, industrial structure developed, much more so in India than in 
Pakistan.  Apart from the state establishing new enterprises, privately owned 
industrial enterprises, and also financial institutions, were nationalised, earlier in 
India and during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s “experiment with socialism,” as Hasan (p. 
187) puts it, during his regime of 1971–77 in Pakistan.  It is well known that in the 
era of public sector dominance, the state entered into many economic activities for 
which there was no conceivable social rationale for it to do so, such as for 
example, owning and operating luxury hotels or producing bread.  Needless to say, 
many of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) ran at a loss (even when due 
allowance was made for any uncompensated social services, if any provided, by 
them), and the profit-making enterprises were mostly state monopolies.  Thus, the 
fiscal burden of SOEs was significant. 
Although economic liberalisation began hesitantly in the mid-eighties, a 
rethinking of the state-led, inward-oriented development strategy in India came about 
only after the macro-economic and balance of payments crisis in 1991.
1  The hesitant 
liberalisation of the 1980s, coupled with fiscal expansion, financed by domestic and 
external borrowing at non-concessional terms, led to a sharp acceleration in growth to 
5.8 percent per year on the average.  However, it was unsustainable, given the growing 
fiscal and current account deficits.  The rising political uncertainty, with three changes 
in the Prime Ministership during 1980-91, and the pressure on balance of payments 
following the steep rise in oil imports with the onset of the Gulf War, triggered the 
crisis of 1991.  As is to be expected, India had to seek the assistance of the 
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International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in meeting the crisis.  However, I 
believe that once the immediate crisis management had been completed, a rethinking 
of development strategy would not have followed but for two critical events.  The first 
was the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union whose Central Planning 
and state control of the economy were the models for India.  The second was the 
spectacular economic growth of China since its economic liberalisation and opening to 
foreign trade and investment in 1978.  The fear of being left behind by China, with 
whom India had fought and lost a border war in 1962, motivated a re-evaluation of 
India’s development strategy and the initiation of system’s reforms in 1991.  After a 
drastic fall in GDP growth in the crisis year, the economy recovered.  The average rate 
of growth of the decade of the 1990s after the reforms was around 6 percent per year.  
In fact, in the last two decades of the twentieth century, India was among the top ten 




1.2  Economic Reforms:  Liberalisation of Foreign Trade  
and Investment, Privatisation, and Regulation 
The systemic economic reforms undertaken in 1991 included the dismantling 
of a whole host of controls on foreign trade and investment.  The rethinking also 
involved the role of the state in the economy—in particular, its ownership and 
operation of enterprises producing goods and services for which there was social 
rationale.  The aggregate losses of non-financial public enterprises added to the 
overall fiscal deficit by about 2 percent to 3 percent of GDP in 1991.  A policy of 
divestment of part of public ownership, without transfer of managerial control, was 
initiated.  It took several years before the word “Privatisation” was no longer 
politically incorrect.  First a department, and later a ministry, were created and a 
minister with cabinet rank appointed to carry forward the process of disinvestment.  
However, until about 12-18 months ago, the extent of disinvestment in India as a 
proportion of the value of the assets of the public sector was extremely modest, with 
essentially one enterprise, a public sector bakery, having been fully privatised.  Since 
then the pace accelerated, with major disinvestments in telecommunications, but 
only to be stalled in the final months of 2002 when the proposal to sell two public 
sector oil companies was temporarily postponed.
2  Even including the successful 
telecom Privatisation, some estimates suggest that India has been able to achieve 
only 40 percent of the targeted privatisation with last two years.   
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Pakistan was clearly ahead of India in initiating the process of privatisation.  
According to Kemal (2000), the process started during the mid-eighties, and several 
public enterprises were identified for partial disinvestment of their shares.  However, 
no concrete progress was made except for the sale of 10 percent of shares in Pakistan 
International Airlines by guaranteeing a 12.5 percent rate of profit to buyers.   
Dissatisfaction with its slow pace and failure to divest some profit as well as some 
loss making enterprises led to the establishment of a Privatisation  Commission in 
1991 by the Nawaz Sharif government, which came to power in November 1990.  It 
identified 112 units to privatise in the initial phase and succeeded in privatising 68 
units.  But after it went out of power in 1993, the pace slowed down and resumed 
only after 2000 [APFOL (2002), Chapter III].  Although a much larger share of 
public assets have been divested in Pakistan compared to India, some observers, 
including Kemal, view the outcomes of privatisations as ambiguous at best. 
The governments in India and Pakistan are clearly committed to accelerating 
the pace of disinvestment, although in India it is open to doubt whether this 
commitment is shared by all members of the multiparty coalition cabinet or confined 
only to the Prime Minister and the Disinvestment Minister.  However, it is also clear 
that a convincing case is yet to be made in either country, based on actual experience 
with privatisation thus far, that it has by and large achieved its objectives and that 
further privatisation is essential for achieving more rapid, efficient, and better 
distributed growth.  In the rest of my talk, I will begin with the analytics of 
privatisation, in particular, whether or not a change in ownership per se from public 
to private hands would lead to beneficial outcomes.  My discussion will highlight the 
distinction between activities or sectors in which significant competition to a 
privatised enterprise could be reasonably assured, either because it already exists or 
could be brought about through policy.  In an activity which happens to be a natural 
monopoly, clearly competition is ruled out.  In other activities, scale economies 
together with market size could sustain only a few firms.  In either case, a regulatory 
framework has to be established to ensure that privatised firms make pricing and 
output decisions that are socially optimal.  I will briefly touch on what economic 
theory has to say on regulatory frameworks.   
Much of the large literature on regulation presumes that regulated activities 
operate in an otherwise competitive economy in which governance problems are 
absent.  Put another way, the literature mostly deals with issues of competition, 
privatisation and regulation in an economy with no significant distortions.  Also, the 
literature by and large implicitly assumes a closed economy.  I need hardly remind 
this audience that distortions are rampant, and problems of governance are extremely 
serious in the economies of South Asia.  Among the distortions of major significance, 
one has to include labour and bankruptcy laws.  Also our process of privatisation     
is part of a broader programme of economic liberalisation, including most 
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the general theory of distortions, and of the second best policies, is that reforms 
which would have led to greater efficiency and welfare in a distortion free economy, 
need not do so, as long as some distortions remain even after reforms.  My point is 
that privatisation need not lead to the beneficial outcomes in our context, if it 
accentuates the effects of the continuing distortions.  I will illustrate this with some 
example later on.  After my brief review of theory, I will return to the very 
interesting discussion of Pakistani privatisation by my friend A. R. Kemal, and also 
Parvez Hasan, with whom I have interacted and been friends with since the days long 
ago when we were both graduate students at Yale.  I will then conclude. 
 
2.  PRIVATISATION—SOME ANALYTICAL AND POLICY ISSUES
3 
Since privatisation by definition involves transferring from public to private 
hands a part or whole of the ownership and control of an enterprise or activity 
producing goods and services, it is useful to remind ourselves of the rationale for 
such enterprises to be publicly owned in the first place.  It is well understood that 
extending the role of government beyond strict governance (maintenance of law and 
order, defense and civil administration, control of currency and money supply, 
enforcement of contracts and property rights) requires justification.  Such a 
justification often is based on some form of market failure, including coordination 
failure.  Again, conventional economic reasoning suggests that market failure is very 
likely if the commodity or service involved has the characteristics of a public good 
or its production technology is subject to significant scale economies.  Coordination 
failure was the basis of the big-push development strategies of Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1970).  He argued that investment in any of one of several activities in isolation 
would not be profitable, but simultaneous and coordinated investment in all of them 
would make each profitable.  Both because the scale of such a coordinated 
investment package was deemed beyond the capacity of the private sector to 
mobilise, and even if it was within the capacity, because coordination would not 
materialise on its own, he suggested that the state had to undertake at least a 
coordinating role, if not undertake the investment by itself. 
This is not the occasion to revisit the debate and vast literature on the role of 
the state in development.  Let me first mention a few points relevant to the present 
discussion, starting with Dixit’s (1996) characterisation of the state implicit in the 
early development literature.  First it was deemed omniscient:  it had all the 
information needed to fulfil its assigned role.  Second, it was omnipotent:  it had the 
capability to enforce its chosen actions fully and effectively.  Above all, it was 
benevolent:  in choosing its actions its objective was to further social welfare.   
Needless to say, few states in the world, let alone states in South Asia, would satisfy 
Dixit’s description! If the state is not omniscient, problems of lack of, and 
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asymmetric, information arise in designing policy.  If it is not omnipotent, it cannot 
ensure that any socially optimal or first best policy can in fact be fully implemented.  
Lastly, if the state is not benevolent, its choosing and implementing a socially 
optimal policy becomes moot.  Nonetheless, development theory and analysis 
proceeded in the early days (and still do, though less so) as if the state were Dixitian.   
In many developing countries, including India and Pakistan, whether or not 
the state had the information, capacity and desire to promote social welfare, it has 
extended its control over the economy far beyond what would be justified under 
conventional theories of market failure.  This avoidable extension and its deleterious 
consequences are in part a motivation for privatisation.  Further, technological 
change has made considerations of scale economies (e.g. in electricity generation) 
less important than earlier, and the information technology revolution has made 
possible private delivery of some type of educational and health services, bypassing 
conventional public-sector-based modes of delivery.  Lastly, in the context of 
globalisation, competitiveness in world markets, and the ability to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI), depend on the quality and adequacy of physical 
infrastructure and human capital.  The inadequacy and poor quality of largely state-
run infrastructure in South Asia are well known.  Already in both our countries 
private sector has been invited to invest in physical infrastructure.  However, a 
rethinking of the roles of different levels (federal, state and provincial, and local) of 
government and that of the private sector in education and health is overdue.  The 
failure of the state run schools and its tragic consequences in Pakistan and in some 
parts of India are well known. 
I have said enough to suggest that the state in South Asia is overextended.  
Besides, for the reason in part that the state is not a Dixitian development state, the 
performance of state enterprises could hardly be described as economically efficient 
and socially welfare enhancing.  Prima facie, this would be a motivation, as I said a 
moment ago, for the state to contract, and whatever activities that are retained in 
state hands should be restructured as to improve economic efficiency.  However at a 
deeper level, one has to ask whether given the political economy of South Asia how 
realistic it is to expect that state would contract enough (put another way, 
privatisation would go far enough), the processes of privatisation would be such as to 
ensure that the state gets adequately compensated for the assets it sells to the private 
sector, and above all, the privatised enterprise would perform more efficiently.  The 
analyses of Kemal (2002) and APFOL (2002) of Pakistan’s privatisation experience 
is sobering in this regard.  Ishrat Husain, before he assumed governorship of the 
State Bank of Pakistan, has described the political economy of Pakistan as capture of 
the economy by an èlitist class of civil servants, landlords, merchant capitalists of big 
industry and big business, military officers and elected politicians [Husain (1999, 
1 9 9 9 a ) ] .   T h i s  c l a s s ,  i n  H u s a i n ’ s  v i e w , pursued a model of growth with three 
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a powerful bureaucracy that implemented the leader’s dictates, regardless of their 
legality or relevance to larger public interest, and a supine population that meekly 
submitted to the demands of leaders and their bureaucratic henchmen.  It would be 
foolish of me to speculate whether Governor Husain’s analysis still holds in large 
measure—but if it does, the prospects of successfully reforming Pakistan’s economy 
would be considerably diminished.   
Before discussing the alternative methods of privatisation , let me draw an 
important distinction  between enterprises that produce goods and services that are 
sold in a potentially competitive market, and public goods and services produced 
under significant scale economies so that sale in a truly competitive market is 
infeasible.  In such a situation, privatising a public monopoly has to be accompanied, 
if not preceded by the creation of a regulatory framework.  In the case of the first 
category of enterprises, issues of privatisation are relatively straightforward.   
Although the domestic market could be potentially competitive, it might not be in 
reality.  For example, in the hey days of the licence-permit-raj in India there were 
significant entry barriers.  Aggregate capacity to be created in any industry was 
determined by the target set in each five-year plan, and this capacity was allocated 
(in a discretionary and nontransparent manner) through industrial licensing among 
applicants.  In such a system, there were obvious incentives for producers already in 
the industry to secure a licence for additional capacity merely to prevent someone 
else from getting it and competing with him.  Sometimes the licenced capacity was 
not installed by the licencee due to his fear that doing so and adding to output would 
erode his monopoly or oligopoly rents.  In any case, with relatively few enterprises 
accounting for the bulk of the licenced capacity (and in the case of traded goods, 
imports being restricted through import licensing), competition was severely 
constrained in such industries.   
Of course, once capacity and import licensing are abolished, as they have 
been, in principle significant competition would ensue, although tariff barriers could 
protect some inefficiency.  In India, competitive pressures from imports from China 
led Indian producers to ask for and receive additional protection in the form of anti-
dumping duties on Chinese imports.  I happen to believe that whether it is U.S. steel 
producers or Indian producers of substitutes for imports from China, the charge of 
dumping by external competitors is just a means for getting a protective shelter for 
their own lack of competitiveness.
4  Be that as it may, for most internationally traded 
goods, each of which has many substitutes, opening the economy to trade, with very 
modest tariffs, if necessary, ought to be adequate to ensure competition, provided 
users are well-informed of characteristics and costs of alternative products.   
Information issue is salient for differentiated products, particularly consumer 
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durables and also for drugs and pharmaceuticals.  Information asymmetries could be 
a source of serious market failure if consumers have to rely on physicians (who in 
turn depend on salesmen) for information on medicines.  For all these reasons, 
consumer protection laws and competition laws relating to restrictive trade practices 
also have a role to play in ensuring competition along with trade liberalisation. 
Public production and provision of goods and services which generate 
externalities or have the characteristics of public goods is a common practice.  The 
fact that in a competitive equilibrium, goods that generate positive (negative) 
externalities would be under (over) provided is not in itself a justification for their 
production in the public sector, since there is the alternative of optimally subsidising 
(taxing) private production or consumption.  The real issue is whether the fiscal 
system is less efficient or cost-effective compared to public production and provision 
of such goods.  Clearly, there are well understood information problems, but these 
arise in either case. 
Turning now to objectives of privatisation, the mission statement of the 
Privatisation Commission in Pakistan, as quoted by Kemal (2000), expresses them 
well: 
“Privatisation  is envisaged to foster competition, ensuring greater capital 
investment, competitiveness, and modernisation, resulting in enhancement of 
employment and provision of improved quality of products and services to the 
consumers and reduction in the fiscal burden” (144). 
Kemal’s paper also discusses various modes of privatisation adopted in 
Pakistan and elsewhere, varying from outright liquidation, sale of assets through 
various means such as sale of equity in stock markets, through financial institutions, 
auctions (sealed and open bid), private placement and strategic sales.  In discussing 
provision of public goods, I have already alluded to allowing the private sector to 
supply such goods while ensuring that efficiency and distributional objectives are 
achieved through the fiscal system of appropriate taxes and subsidies to the relevant 
producers and consumers or through price controls and cross-subsidisation.  Other 
alternatives to sale of public assets to the private sector are franchising and leasing. 
In comparing alternative modes, one has to keep in mind that the basic 
objective is to realise the maximum value or return from the assets being sold or 
leased.  Here again it matters a great deal whether there would be adequate 
competition among potential purchasers and whether informational asymmetries are 
present.  For example, there is a very well-developed theory of auctions, and its 
insights have in fact been used in the design of spectrum auctions, for example in the 
United States.  However, even in industrialised countries in telecommunications 
auctions overbidding, based on what turned to be unrealistic expectations ex post of 
the size and profitability of the market, has been observed.  Overbidding might also 
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The intended sale of two publicly-owned petroleum companies in India was 
postponed for a time, in part because it was feared that the successful purchaser 
would turn out to be one who already has a major stake in the industry, and this 
would enhance his market power.  Incidentally, one of the foremost auction theorists, 
Robert Weber, recently suggested at a conference on Game Theory in Mumbai, that 
an appropriately designed simultaneous auction of the two companies would raise 
the maximum revenue without the winner running into the winner’s curse.   
Interestingly, the Nobel Laureate John Nash raised doubts about the efficacy of the 
procedure suggested by Weber for the reason that there could be a non-serious bidder 
whose main job is raising the cost for other bidders in such simultaneous auctions 
and the seller has licensure that there is no such bidder (Economic Times, January 6, 
2003).  Turning insights from theories developed for advanced countries into 
practical proposals for poor countries such as ours with serious problems of 
corruption is not simple.  Determining a fair value of public assets offered for sale, 
designing a transparent, fair and manipulation-free sale process, ensuring that hold 
ups and ex post renegotiations do not occur, are difficult issues conceptually and 
practically.  Conceptual difficulties arise from the fact that developing economies are 
hardly ones with complete markets with players who have rational expectations and 
in which informational asymmetries are absent.  Given that privatisation is relatively 
recent in our region, it is but natural that mistakes occurred though hopefully 
learning from mistakes has occurred as well.   
Let me cite a very interesting and instructive analysis by Lopez-de-Silanes 
(1997) of the auction prices realised from privatisation using firm-level data for all 
236 Mexican companies privatised between 1983 and 1992.  He found that on an 
average, net prices (net of any cost of restructuring incurred prior to auction) were 
only 54 percent of the value of the public assets auctioned.  He attributes the low 
realisation to three factors: restrictions limiting participation, and hence competition, 
in auctions; excessively long process of privatisation  that allowed deterioration of 
incentives and performance of firms between the time of announcement of intention 
to privatise and of actual sale; and finally restructuring measures that merely delayed 
privatisation  without increasing realised prices.  His estimates suggest that realised 
prices would have risen to 71 percent of the value of assets had the government 
emphasised speed, succeeded in divesting assets one year less on the average and 
fired the Chief Executive Officer as the only restructuring measure. 
It is often argued in both India and Pakistan that first, profit making public 
enterprises should not be privatised, and second, realised sale value of such an 
enterprise in competitive markets with players with perfect foresight will yield no 
surplus for the state over discounted present value of future profits.  This argument is 
not so sound.  Unless the publicly owned enterprise is already earning maximum 
profits so that no private entrepreneur bidding for it could possibly earn more, which 
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premise.   The issue is not whether or not an enterprise is making profits and earning 
the market rate of return, but whether there is any social rationale for it to be in the 
public sector.  If there is none, it should be privatised.  If it is profitable, but earns 
less than the social cost of capital, it should be privatised.  More generally, it is not 
so much the actual loss or profits at often distorted prices that should determine the 
decision to privatise.  Simply put, if there is no sound social rationale for an 
enterprise to continue to be in the public sector, such as for example, the lack of an 
environment in which the privatised enterprise would operate efficiently, it should be 
privatised. 
Before turning to creation of regulatory frameworks for privatised 
monopolies, quasi-monopolies, and the financial sector, let me raise some issues 
regarding privatisation that are peculiar to India and Pakistan.  Our public enterprises 
are over-manned, and the workforce is overpaid relative to productivity.  They 
provide subsidised housing, health care, and other benefits to workers, and saddled 
with ostensibly social responsibilities for which they are inadequately compensated.  
It is no surprise that employees of such enterprises fear being let go and losing some 
benefits were the enterprise to be privatised.  But benefits expected from privatisation  
would obviously not be realised if the privatised enterprise is constrained from 
rationalising its labour force or, in effect, have to buy workers off with expensive 
separation payments.  In fact, anticipating such problems, potential buyers would 
either not bid or bid less than what the enterprise would be worth had the constraints 
not been present, as the analysis of Lopez-de-Silanes demonstrates.  There is no 
doubt labour laws, which have remained out of touch with realities of labour 
markets, have raised the costs of hiring and firing workers.  Indeed, the use of casual 
substitute labour hired on a short-term basis, and of contract labour are responses to 
the dysfunctional labour laws.  Ironically, while private enterprises often get around 
the labour laws through such practices at some cost that adversely affects their 
competitiveness, public enterprises are unable to get around them.  This not only 
affects their performance but reduces the chances of their realising their value if they 
are successfully privatised.  This being the case, it is not surprising that public 
enterprises often do not perform much better after their privatisation than before. 
Another issue that needs some analysis is whether public enterprises should 
be restructured before they are put up for sale, instead of on an as is where is basis.  
It is argued that such restructuring would raise their sale value.  Needless to say that 
restructuring would cost resources and a private buyer would offer no more to a 
restructured enterprise than it would have cost him to do it himself were he to buy it 
on an as is where is basis, and he would spend just as much on restructuring as 
would be justified by the discounted stream of additional returns from restructuring.  
Under the circumstances, unless there are reasons to believe that the cost to the 
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restructuring prior to sale is a money-losing proposition.  Once again, the analysis of 
Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) confirms this expectation. 
Finally, there is the issue of whether amounts realised from sales of public 
assets should be used to pay off public debt or be treated as current revenues and, in 
effect, used to reduce the level of fiscal deficit from what it would otherwise have 
been.  At one level, the first option seems eminently reasonable—the revenues from 
sales of assets should be used to reduce liabilities.  But on reflection, it is not that 
obvious:  after all, if the government were to use its revenues optimally, then the 
marginal value (in terms of the government’s objective) of a rupee of revenue in any 
of its uses, whether for reducing debt or deficits, would be the same.  Put another 
way, paying down debt by a rupee saves future flows of servicing a rupee of debt.  
On the other hand, using it to reduce an exogenous fiscal deficit by a rupee means 
that a rupee of debt, which otherwise would have been created with its own future 
debt-service obligations in financing the deficit, would not be created.  Thus there is 
essentially no difference from this perspective between the two alternative uses of 
privatisation revenue.  However, there is a political economy argument in favour of 
using it to pay down debt, namely, it would put greater pressure on bringing down 
the fiscal deficit.  Whether this is a persuasive argument in the political economy of 
India and Pakistan, in which only a crisis seems to motivate reform of any kind, is 
arguable. 
 
3.   REGULATION 
The economic theory of regulation, which was initiated by the late Nobel 
Laureate Stigler (1971) and Posner (1971) more than three decades ago has attracted 
many theorists to contribute to it.  Peltzman (1989) reviewed the state of theory 
following a decade of deregulation in the United States.  The French economists 
Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1986a, 1990, 1990a, 1991, 1993) have written extensively 
on various aspects of regulation, including a very recent (2001) volume on 
telecommunications.  Their work on network pricing jointly with P. Rey is also 
relevant [Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1996, 1996a)].  Other major contributors include 
Joskow (1989, 2000), Schmalansee (1989), and many others.  Judge Richard Posner 
pointed out that one of the functions of regulation is to redistribute and allocate 
resources, functions that are normally in the domain of fiscal authorities.  Posner’s 
recognition of this function arose from the failure of the two traditional views of 
regulation, either that it is primarily to protect the public (at least large subclasses of 
the public) against monopoly or that it is procured for their own protection by 
politically effective groups, assumed to be the members of the regulated industry 
itself, to explain why in many regulated industries many services continue to be 
provided at lower rates and in larger quantities than would be offered in an 
unregulated competitive market or, a fortiori, an unregulated monopoly.  Given the 
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agencies are performing fiscal functions.  For the same reason, it is too soon to tell 
whether the theory of regulatory capture analysed, for example, by Laffont and 
Tirole (1991), is of relevance. 
One of the main points emerging from the vast literature is that many of the 
goals of privatisation could be achieved, sometimes at lower cost, through other 
policies [Yarrow (1986)].   Simply privatising a firm, that is changing its ownership, 
will not guarantee any significant efficiency improvements.  Caves and Christiansen 
(1980) studied privately and publicly owned Canadian railroads and found no 
evidence that public ownership is inherently less productive than private ownership.  
The more important issue is how privatisation changes the incentives of those who 
would be managing the enterprise.  Thus privatisation is just one means to this end, 
and in the case of natural monopolies, must be accompanied by regulation to ensure 
incentives for efficient, low-cost service provision.  An early study by Davies (1971) 
showed that a regulated private airline in Australia was much more economically 
efficient than the public one.  The notion that privatised public monopoly would 
maximise profits at the cost of social welfare is not supported in theory.  The reason 
is that public monopolies do not always maximise welfare, and a regulated private 
monopoly cannot ignore social welfare impacts of its actions.  Thus in a well-
regulated private monopoly, considerations of efficiency on profit and social welfare 
would be balanced in an appropriate fashion. 
The literature on alternative modes of regulation such as rate of return 
regulation, price regulation, particularly pricing of access to telecommunications 
networks and power grids, cost plus contracts and so on is again rich and vast.  The 
literature also brings into the analysis in an essential way issues of asymmetries of 
information such as, for example, information about technology and cost reducing 
actions being private to regulated firms and unavailable to the regulators.   
Consideration of such asymmetries has led to the analysis of incentive-based 
regulation.  The forms of such regulation include procedures or formulas for 
adjusting allowable prices as costs or realised rates of return change relative to some 
norm, yardstick approaches in which a firm’s performance is evaluated relative to 
others, and incentives tied to cost or performance components.  Finally, the literature 
also addresses various political economy issues, including how citizen vigilance or 
presence could be harnessed to monitor the performance of regulated monopolies 
and the use of the so-called “sunshine regulation,” which seeks to use public opinion 
to regulate electricity, transport, etc., and has had some limited success in Great 
Britain. 
The literature is rich with alternative models on the basis of which optimal 
regulatory rules,  applicable to a wide variety of contexts, are derived.  This is not an 
occasion to delve deep into the assumptions of various models, their algebraic 
formulations and derivations of rules.  Let me just cite a few broad conclusions from 
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better left to be tackled through other policy measures than through pricing and 
regulatory decisions.  The relevance of this finding is painfully obvious from the 
disastrous experience with subsidies in health care, education, power, and irrigation.  
In industries in which scale economies are large, efficient marginal cost pricing 
would lead the firm to lose money.  In such a case, the issue is whether one should 
give up insisting on marginal cost pricing and look for second-best optimal pricing 
rules given the constraint that the firm breaks even, or whether the firm’s losses 
should be compensated and the resources needed for such compensation being raised 
through non-distortionary means.  Although the latter is the first-best solution, its 
limitations from the perspective of implementation are many.   
Another issue relates to pricing of access to networks, an inevitable 
consideration in electricity and telecommunications sectors in which there are 
potentially competitive parts of services that could be unbundled [Vickers (1997)].  
There are two main approaches to this issue.  The first is to unbundle the vertically 
integrated monopoly and bar its spin-off facility that retains the network from 
entering the competitive segment or to preserve the integrated firm, allow 
competition in the competitive parts, ensure access to the network for the 
competitors, and regulate access prices.  In the latter case, regulation is complicated:  
regulated access prices, as well as any other service charges, have to be such that 
they do not create over-entry into competitive segments, future investment in the 
regulated monopoly is not discouraged, and incentives for inefficiently bypassing the 
access provided by the regulated firm do not arise.  Two common access pricing 
rules are the following:  one links access price to the reduction in the integrated 
monopoly firm’s profits because of providing access to competitors in other 
segments to its network.  The other sets access price to equal direct cost of access 
plus the opportunity cost to the integrated provider firm providing access.  Clearly, if 
and when our electricity sector is truly reformed the issue of the pricing of access to 
transmission networks would have to be faced.  Telecommunications reforms are 
further along in both countries.  India’s regulatory authority, the TRAI, is currently 
grappling with the issue of access across the three segments:  mobile (cell), fixed-
line, and limited mobility wireless, while recognising that universal service 
obligations apply only to the fixed-line segment. 
Before concluding this section, let me draw on the Indian experience with 
power sector reform to illustrate how politics can frustrate reform efforts.  Until 
recently, almost all of India’s electricity generation, transmission and distribution 
were in the hands of State Electricity Boards (SEBs), which are monopolies owned 
by each state.  After the introduction of irrigation-intensive green revolution 
technology for rice and wheat crops, electricity use in pumping irrigation water from 
tube-wells increased enormously.  With its  emphasis on attaining food self-
sufficiency and the expansion of the Public Distribution System (PDS), the 
government guaranteed purchasing whatever amount of foodgrains farmers offered Privatisation, Regulation, and Competition  403
for sale at the so-called minimum support prices so that farmers had the incentives to 
adopt the new technology without running the risk of price falls from expanded 
output.  Government meant to purchase only what was needed to run the PDS at 
higher procurement prices.  In addition to price support, subsidies on inputs 
including electricity, irrigation water from public canals, and fertilisers were offered.  
Over time the distinction between minimum support prices and higher procurement 
prices disappeared, the latter in effect becoming the former.  Also a strong farm 
lobby emerged which succeeded in ensuring that procurement prices rose over time 
and subsidies expanded.  In particular, subsidies on electricity sales to farmers 
expanded with some states giving electricity away free to farmers.  Subsidising 
inputs including electricity increases their use.  To the extent input-intensification 
per unit of land increases yields per hectare and output the fiscal cost of high support 
prices rises.  Further, excessive pumping of water with subsidised power leads to 
lowering of water tables, water-logging, and salinity.  Apart from heavily subsidised 
and free sales to farmers, there was widespread theft of electricity.
5  E v e n  w i t h  
higher charges to commercial users, the loss from theft and subsidised sales could 
not be covered.  Over time, SEBs accumulated huge losses and were essentially 
bankrupt.  Reserve Bank of India (2003, p. II.33) reports that the rate of return on 
state investment in power deteriorated from an already negative, –12.7 percent in 
1991-92, to –32.8 percent in 2001-02. 
The state governments, the owners of SEBs, were themselves running fiscal 
deficits to which the losses of SEBs were a major contributor.  The redistributive 
public finance aspect of the subsidies is most likely to be regressive:  the beneficiary 
farmers are not necessarily the poor, and any distortions, either in taxes levied to 
finance the subsidies in part or other price distortions induced by the subsidies are 
likely to hurt the poor more than the non-poor.  Besides, this convoluted 
redistributive process is opaque.
6   The poor finances of the SEBs meant they nor the 
state governments were in a position to finance needed investment in capacity.  Their 
financial condition naturally limited their ability to borrow and invest.  Under these 
dire circumstances, it is no surprise that a decision was made to invite private 
investors, domestic and foreign, to invest in power generation.  Given the urgency, 
expedited procedures for appraising proposals and devising appropriate contracts 
were adopted.  Enron was one of the foreign investors that signed a contract to invest 
in a massive power plant near Mumbai in the state of Maharashtra. 
The saga of Enron illustrates the many problems, both of economics but more 
importantly of politics, that plague privatisation in South Asia.  To start with politics, 
 
5The situation in Pakistan is apparently no different.  APFOL (2002, p. 39) reports that the critical 
issues of “losses in generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, theft and misuse and 
improvement in the quality of services” are yet to be resolved. 
6Ijaz Nabi drew my attention to the free supply of electricity to the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas of Pakistan, adjoining Afghanistan, as another example of corrupt, inefficient, and opaque 
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the then government in power in the state, controlled by the Congress Party, 
negotiated the deal for the first phase of the investment with Enron, which included a 
power purchase agreement (PPA).  Before Enron began the construction, the 
Congress Party was defeated in an election to the State Assembly.  The Shiv Sena, 
which won, had campaigned against the Enron deal, accusing the Congress Party of 
corruption in giving away too much to Enron under the PPA, and announced it 
would scrap the agreement if elected.  But after a visit by Ms. Rebecca Mark, then a 
senior executive of Enron, to Mr Bal Thackeray, Leader of the Shiv Sena, the party 
agreed to go ahead with the investment, not only its first phase but also an even 
larger second phase.  The PPA was revised, but not in any major way.  Interestingly, 
it became public later than Enron claimed to have spent several million dollars in 
“educating” Indians about the agreement.  I need not spell out who the beneficiaries 
of this “education” might have been!  Both phases of investment were completed 
during the term of the Shiv Sena government and power generation began.  At the 
next election, the Shiv Sena government was defeated and a coalition, including the 
Congress Party, came to power.  The new government refused to buy power from 
Enron’s plant as it had become too costly.  Eventually, the plant shut down and as of 
now, the massive power plant is idle.  In the meantime, Enron has gone bankrupt, 
other lenders including Indian banks in the financing of investment, are still 
struggling to find ways for starting the plant. 
Several features of this story are worth noting.  First, the purchaser of power 
generated by Enron was the monopoly, the Maharashtra SEB.  Given that it was 
bankrupt, Enron insisted on and obtained a guarantee of payment for electricity it 
sold to the SEB from its owners, the Maharashtra state government.  Since that 
government itself was in financial stress, Enron obtained counter-guarantees from 
the central government in case the state government failed to pay!  Clearly, the facts 
that the bankrupt SEB was the sole purchaser and the fiscal mess of the state 
government to which the losses of the SEBs contributed a significant extent dictated 
the guarantee parts of the deal.  However, the PPA itself had aspects which reflected 
in part the weak bargaining position of the government given that they were 
desperately seeking to increase power generating capacity.
7  I n  t h e  P P A ,  E n r o n  
managed to pass on to its purchasers, the State Electricity Board, exchange rate risks 
as well as risks from fluctuations in imported LPG, the gas which was the fuel for the 
plant.  Further, the gasification plant, which was of a scale much larger than needed 
for supplying gas to the power plant, was deemed part of the power plant, and its 
capital costs were included in the price of power under the PPA.  Thus business 
risks, normally borne by a supplier, were shifted to the purchaser through higher 
 
7APFOL (2002) points out that Pakistan government had guaranteed a higher price for electricity 
to independent power producers (IPPs) than the state producer and distributor, WAPDA, was charging.  
This created a financial burden on WAPDA which eventually raised the tariffs for consumers.  The award 
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purchase prices in the event of an exchange rate depreciation or a rise in world prices 
of imported gas.  I am skipping other aspects of the PPA, including the fact that 
capital charges remain fixed as variable costs moved with the plant local factor.  In 
any case, as the exchange rate depreciated and LPG prices went up, the price of 
power under the PPA became too high for the SEB to afford to buy, given that its 
average selling price to users could not be revised. 
This episode illustrates how an attempt to privatise a part of an integrated 
monopolised sector which itself was subject to politically determined sale prices, 
could go awry.  Now moving forward in power sector reform, some Indian states 
unbundled generation, transmission and distribution and allowed private sector to 
enter generation.  Only two states, Orissa and Delhi, have privatised distribution.  
Many have established, ostensibly independent, regulatory commissions for the 
setting of electricity tariffs.  Yet there has been no significant improvement in the 
overall power situation, even after a decade of opening up private sector accounts for 
only 10 percent of generating capacity.  There are basically two main reasons for 
this.  First of all, private generators still have to sell power to State monopolies and 
do not have much say on prices they receive.  Second, unless adequate competition 
can be assured, privatisation cannot fully deliver its benefits.   
The experience of the State of Orissa dramatically illustrates the pitfalls of 
poorly designed privatisation.  Although there was unbundling, all generating 
companies (Gencos) had to sell their output to the state-owned transmission 
company (Transco).  At the other end, distribution companies (Distcos) had to 
buy their power from Transco and consumers had to buy their power from the 
Distco in their area.  Thus, no genuinely competitive electricity market was 
created in which generators could sell in competitive spot markets or enter into 
long-term contracts with Distcos or ultimate consumers.  In turn, Distcos and 
consumers did not have many alternative suppliers to compete for their custom.  
Had Transco been turned into a regulated monopoly (private or public) which 
provided access to all comers at a regulated access price, there could have been 
entry and competition in both generation and distribution segments.  Besides, 
without a fundamental reform of electricity pricing, and curbing of incentives for 
theft, not much progress can be expected.  In large parts of the country, farmer’s 
use of electricity is not even metered.  Also, interstate transmissions of 
electricity through the grid has been plagued by indiscipline—states have failed 
to follow the instructions of grid managers and have attempted to draw more 
than what others could supply leading to system outage.  Pakistani experience 
with privatisation of power generation suggests that it has had its pluses and 
minuses. Although the involvement of independent power producers has resulted 
in a number of problems [APFOL (2002), Chapter VII], a power surplus emerged 
(apparently only temporarily) in contrast to an estimated average deficit of 8 
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A national market for good quality (i.e. constant voltage) and reliable (no 
brown-outs and black-outs) power, with a variety of market instruments such as sale 
and purchase in spot markets, and contracts for medium to long term and appropriate 
time-dependent pricing is a distant dream in India and Pakistan.  But there is no harm 
in dreaming—sometimes, dreams become realities.  One of my dreams is a South 
Asia-wide electricity market, based on a grid linking Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and 
Pakistan (and perhaps even Sri Lanka), and regulated by a regional agency.  My 
dream gets even more fanciful on occasion, and visualises a South Asia-wide energy 
market with grids, pipelines, road and rail transport being used for transporting 
various forms of primary and secondary energy. 
Turning away from dreams to reality, the harsh consequence of the poor 
quality and reliability of the electric system has been costly captive power 
generation, not only by industrial enterprises but even by commercial establishments, 
including retail shops.  Were the system to be more efficient and to deliver reliable 
good quality power, and were it to be economically priced, it is very likely that less 
additional capacity needs to be created for meeting the expected growth in demand.  
There is also some empirical evidence suggesting that those (e.g. farmers) who are 
provided subsidised or free power, but of poor quality and reliability, would be 
willing to pay for better quality and more reliable power. 
In contrast with the poor record in reforming the power sector, 
telecommunications reform and privatisation has been a spectacular success in India, 
and I am sure in Pakistan as well, if success is measured not only in terms of the 
revenue generated for the government from auctions, but also the dramatic fall in the 
cost of long distance telephone calls, domestic and international.  The quality of 
service has improved greatly as well.  On the other hand, in terms of universal 
service provision, the post-privatisation performance is not an unambiguous success.  
There are several reasons for the relative success of telecommunications reform 
including, first, the fact that with low tele-density, even though there was cross-
subsidisation of local by long distance users, there was no strong and entrenched 
lobby opposing rebalancing of tariffs.  Second, unlike electricity reform where a 
price rise was expected by almost all users, even though to a greater extent in some 
cases than others, it was universally expected that the cost of telecommunications 
service would fall with privatisation and reforms.  Finally, rapid advances in 
telecommunications technology made dependence on traditional wire-based 
telephony much less of a constraint. 
This is not to say that the reform process was smooth in India.  Part of the 
problem was that telecom privatisation and reform was fairly recent even in rich 
countries and experience was thus somewhat limited.  Second, when the Telecom 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was first established, the Department of 
Telecommunications (DOT) was not only responsible for making telecommunications 
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enterprise owned and operated by it.  Thus TRAI was in an anomalous position as a 
regulator, having authority to regulate over enterprises owned by an agency which also 
dictated policy!  Eventually, the public enterprises were made autonomous, 
corporatised and independent of DOT.  Within a few years of its establishment, TRAI 
itself was reorganised with the creation of a separate tribunal to hear appeals against 
the ruling of TRAI.  The rapid change in technology has not made the task of TRAI 
any easier—in the first half of 2003, a private operation introduced limited mobility 
wireless telephony and challenged both the cell and fixed line firms.  This induced a 
price war going on with consumers benefiting from steep falls in prices.  It is too soon 
to tell whether a relatively stable structure has emerged in the industry. 
One other cautionary tale about Indian telecom reforms is worth recounting.  
When bids were sought for provision of certain services, there was what turned out 
to be ex post overbidding.  It is hard to tell whether overbidding was strategic or it 
was simply due to an overoptimistic forecast of future demands and revenues.  In any 
case, once the winners realised that they cannot afford to pay the licence fee they had 
bid, they clamoured for a revision of their contract.  In effect, they held up the 
government:  either it renegotiated the contract or else the firm would go bankrupt 
and the promised service would not be provided.  The government in effect conceded 
defeat by renegotiating the contract into a revenue sharing one, rather than a fixed 
fee one.  The lesson I draw from this is that designing an auction which is collusion-
proof, generates the maximum revenue, and above all avoids hold-up and 
renegotiation, is exceedingly complex. 
Turning now to the vital financial sector, state-owned units continue to 
dominate in both our countries.  The state acquired a large share of the investible 
resources of the financial sector for its use at low cost through various liquidity and 
reserve requirements, and had a large say, through various credit allocation 
mechanisms, in how the resources left with the banks were used.  Of course, in both 
India and Pakistan, the nationalised financial sector was repressed until recently 
through controls on deposit and lending rates.  In the era of economic reforms, we 
have moved forward with some privatisation and removal of controls on interest 
rates.  However, real interest rates are still comparatively high primarily because of 
the floor set by administered interest rates on small savings and provident funds.  
The government is now borrowing at market rates rather than use the financial 
system to finance part of its deficit.  In this era, regulation of the financial system, 
including enforcing adequate capital requirements, has assumed great importance.  
There are many open issues in designing the regulatory system.  Khan (2002) in his 
Quaid-i-Azam Memorial Lecture has discussed them in depth.  Let me just flag a 
few.  There is some expectation that the trend towards integration of financial 
services (e.g., universal banking) would not only reduce costs of intermediation 
which are high in South Asia, but also facilitate supervision of intermediaries.  In 
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commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, the stock and bond 
markets as in the U.K., or should there be a separate agency for each segment of the 
sector?  Given that there is a significant degree of substitution among financial 
instruments, how should coordination among individual regulatory agencies be 
ensured if there is one for each sector?   
Turning to capital adequacy norms, it is clear that Basle I and Basle II norms 
have to be modified for our contexts—in other words, given the risk characteristics 
of the portfolios of our banks, what may be adequate capital in rich countries need 
not be so in our case.  The most disturbing feature in our context is, in my view, the 
continuing dominance of state-owned banks.  I am not persuaded that state-owned 
banks can be completely insulated from political interference in making their lending 
decisions.  It will take me too long to illustrate this from Indian experience.  Suffices 
it to say that at least one of the Indian state-owned banks has been recapitalised, not 
once, but several times.  There can be no doubt that such repeated recapitalisation 
sends the wrong signal to banks that they will be bailed out even if they run out of 
capital because of their poor investment decisions.  The point is that as long as the 
state owns the bank, there is no way to prevent re-accumulation of non-performing 
assets once the previously accumulated stock is cleaned up. 
For lack of space I am not discussing interesting features of privatisation and 
regulation in other infrastructures such as roads, ports, railways, etc.  Needless to say 
that in a globalising world, if we are to be competitive, our transport and 
communications networks also have to provide efficient services at competitive 
costs.  There is no doubt that a poorly functioning and relatively expensive 
infrastructure inhibits private investment.  In the era of largely publicly owned 
infrastructure, public investment in that sector crowded in private investment.   With 
public investment declining, the privatisation and reform of infrastructure lagging, 
accelerating growth is a daunting task.  There is a long way to go in reforming these 
activities.  Let me conclude the discussion of regulation by flagging a deeper issue:  
regulatory agencies have executive, judicial, and sometimes even legislative 
functions.  Their exercise of those functions could come into conflict with the 
branches of government to whom constitutions normally assign these functions.   
Clearly, independence, autonomy and credibility of the regulator would be 
destroyed, if the agency were to report to the relevant ministry, and the minister or 
bureaucrat could override its decision.  On the other hand, absence of legislative 
oversight, and access to the judicial system for appeal against its decisions, would be 
inappropriate.  Again, designing a system of oversight that is feasible, credible, 
transparent, and seen as legitimate in our context is a complex task. 
 
4.  PRIVATISATION  IN PAKISTAN 
Hasan (1998, pp. 289-91), in his brief discussion of privatisation and 
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out that the main objectives of the programme “were to reduce the drain of 
government resources caused by losses of state-owned enterprises and to create 
great opportunities of private sector investments because the public sector 
resources for development had become very [scarce] scared (sic)” (p. 289).  He 
noted that the agenda of privatisation covered not only industries but also banks, 
telecommunications, and power generation.  After reviewing the pace and extent 
of privatisation  since the creation of the Privatisation  Commission in January 
1991, he concludes that “the delays in implementation of the privatisation   
programme were to some extent natural, but they also reflected institutional 
weaknesses of the government and the Privatisation  Commission.  The result 
was that the actual transfer of control of assets from the public sector was quite 
modest, the exception being the two commercial banks” (p. 291).  He is critical 
of the fact that the “large proceeds [from privatisation ] . . .should have been 
used mainly to retire public debt  . . [but] instead, they were used to maintain 
unsustainable levels of public expenditures and current account balance of 
payments deficits” (p. 291). 
Whether a public enterprise is losing (or making) money is not in itself an 
argument for its being privatised (or not)—the real issue is whether there is a good 
rationale for an enterprise to be in the public sector.  However, implicit in this 
argument is the idea that if there is a convincing social rationale for an enterprise to 
be in the public sector, any losses incurred (or profits earned) by it should be 
financed (used) in a non-distortionary fashion.  Such financing is unlikely to be 
feasible in our context.  This being the case, in evaluating the social rationale for an 
enterprise to be in the public sector, one has to take into account the social cost of 
financing its losses through distortionary means.  Be that as it may, many of our 
public enterprises lose money, and have no social rationale for being in the public 
sector in the first place.  As such, Hasan (1998) is right in viewing their losses as 
avoidable drain of public resources.  The case for using privatisation  revenues for 
retiring public debt is largely based on political economy grounds, and much less on 
economic logic.  Hasan must have had political economy arguments in mind when 
he expressed his preference for using the revenues for retiring public debt. 
Kemal’s  paper examines empirically whether privatisation in Pakistan 
achieved the objectives of reducing fiscal deficit, improving efficiency of operation, 
increasing investment, and raising growth rates and its impact on real and nominal 
wages as well as growth in employment.  His analysis reports that as of 1998, in all 
106 units had been divested and the government received Rs 59.6 billion through the 
sale of these enterprises.  For an economy of the size of Pakistan (with real GDP at 
factor cost at 1980-81 price of Rs 667 billion in 2000-01) this extent of privatisation  
is extremely modest.  Kemal’s conclusions , which are broadly supported by APFOL 
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“Privatisation  has not been able to reduce the fiscal deficit, which has 
continued to be in the range of six percent [of GDP] . . . average rate of 
growth of GDP has gone down from 5.44 percent to 4.15 percent during pre- 
and post-privatisation  period . . . similarly average rate of growth of 
investment fell from 5.55 percent to just 1.82 percent . . . analysis of variance 
does not show any difference in growth of output . . . return to equity or return 
to fixed assets in the pre- and post-privatisation  period.  The analysis also 
shows that the growth of privatised industries subsequent to privatisation  . . . 
[however] controlling for the general decline in output [during 90s] 
privatisation had no impact in 9 out of 14 industries, in two industries growth 
rate increased and in three industries growth rates fell . . . [total factor 
productivity] increased on an average by two percent in the privatised 
industries [in the post-privatisation period].  Nevertheless, improvement in 
productivity is observed only in vegetable ghee and transport equipment and 
has fallen in the remaining sectors—real prices . . . of the products produced 
by privatised industries have not fallen.  As a matter of fact, they have 
increased . . . restructuring of public enterprises prior to privatisation  has also 
resulted in loss of employment . . . compared to an annual compound growth 
rate of 2.0 [6.5] percent in the overall [manufacturing] employment in the pre-
privatisation  period, growth rate fell to 1.39 [–13.5] percent in the post-
privatisation  period . . . real wage rates in Pakistan have increased in the pre-
privatisation  period but have fallen since then” (pp. 163–65). 
 
These results, if accepted at face value, would constitute an indictment of 
privatisation.  However, there are many reasons why they cannot be interpreted as 
conclusive evidence against privatisation.  First of all, the analysis consists of a 
simple comparison of chosen indicators before and after privatisation.  As is well 
known, such a comparison is methodologically questionable, since there could be 
other factors that influence the indicators besides privatisation, and the simple 
comparison does not control for their effects.  Second, the five year pre-privatisation 
(1986-91) and post-privatisation (1992-97) periods are too short to accommodate 
adequately for expectations about lags in response to privatisation.  For example, 
anticipation of future privatisation could affect performance in the pre-privatisation  
period.  Third, since privatisation covered only an extremely small part of the 
economy, its influence, positive or negative, on aggregate indicators such as fixed 
deficit GDP growth or investment would be very small.  As such, the changes in 
such indicators between the two periods would be largely driven by other factors.  
The same is true for indicators such as aggregate and manufacturing employment, 
wage rates, fiscal deficit or total public debt.  Fourth, the expected benefits, such as 
gains in productivity or returns to capital, from privatisation could be muted if the 
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privatised enterprises.  Fifth, to the extent public enterprises employ far more 
workers than would be economically justified, any restructuring prior to privatisation  
in the expectation of realising higher sale value for the enterprise would naturally 
involve reduction in employment, and this reduction has more to do with over-
manning in public enterprises than to privatisation  per se.   
I do not mean to dispute the facts as reported by Dr Kemal.  But I do have 
strong reservations on his implicitly attributing the observed changes between the 
two periods to privatisation.  Explaining the observed changes will require a more 
elaborate econometric exercise.  The contribution of privatisation is simply the 
difference between what would have been the performance of public enterprises in 
the post-privatisation period, had they remained in the public sector, and their actual 
performance as privatised enterprises.  This obviously involves doing a 
counterfactual analysis, which can be done in alternative ways.  One way would be 
to model the determinants of enterprise performance, including factors exogenous to 
ownership as well as ownership.  The impact of privatisation is then the effect of 
ownership change on performance, conditional on or controlling for other factors.  
Another is to compare privatised firms with two control groups consisting of firms 
that were privately owned always and publicly owned firms that are expected to 
remain so.  An alternative is to use a difference-in-difference method: it compares 
the change in performance of privatised enterprises in the post-privatisation  period 
relative to the pre-privatisation  period with the change in performance of public 
enterprises, otherwise similar to the privatised ones, but which were not privatised.  
My point is simply that Kemal’s before and after comparison is methodologically 
problematic.  This does not necessarily mean that his conclusions would be 
overturned if an appropriate methodology had been used.  However, I believe 
otherwise—an appropriate analysis would have shown a positive but modest 
outcome from an admittedly modest privatisation. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude.  It is evident that the process of privatisation and regulation 
in South Asia has not gone far and has run into problems, many of which could have 
been anticipated.  In particular, some of the expectations about the benefits of 
privatisation were either misplaced or were based on a lack of appreciation of the 
severe constraints of political economy and governance that undercut the potential 
benefits of privatisation. Joshi (2000) suggests three general reasons why 
privatisation is being pursued: 
  •  greater economic democracy through increased private initiatives in 
economic activities; 
  • achieving higher levels of economic growth and employment; 
 •  reducing  budgetary  deficits. T. N. Srinivasan  412
This illustrates what I mean by misplaced expectations about the benefits of 
privatisation.  It should be obvious that privatisation, limited in extent as it was, 
could not be a significant determinant economic growth, employment generation, 
and economic democracy.  I illustrated how our draconian labour laws in India and 
Pakistan constrain the restructuring of staffing of privatised enterprises and thus 
reduce potential benefits from privatisation.  However, I believe that once we modify 
our expectations realistically and allow for the politico-economic-social constraints, 
even our own experience with privatisation, properly analysed, would show its 
positive effects.  As much the lesson that we should draw from our experience is not 
that privatisation has been a failure but only the constraints on achieving its potential 
benefits have to be removed.  This is all the more urgent now. 
The contemporary economic scene in India and Pakistan is sobering.  In India, 
economic growth after reaching a peak of 7.5 percent per year in 1996-97 has since 
slowed down to as low as 4.4 percent in 2000-01.  There was a significant failure of 
the monsoon in 2002.  With an expected fall of around 3 percent in agricultural value 
added, the expected rate of growth in fiscal year 2002-03 is 4.4 percent [RBI (2003), 
Table 2.2].  In my darker moments, I fear that an Indian growth rate might be 
converging to its twenty-first century “Hindu” rate of growth, which I estimate as 
around 5 percent per year, given the structure of India’s economy now as compared 
to the 1950s.  Pakistan’s growth performance in the 1990s has been poor.  What is 
disturbing is that India and Pakistan, at their stage of development, instead of having 
current account deficits financed by sustainable long-term capital flows, are actually 
having current account surpluses.  Also, both are accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves—India’s reserves crossed  $80 billion in early June 2003, and Pakistan’s 
also is rising.  While it is prudent to hold reserves to smooth fluctuation in trade and 
short-term capital flows, I am not convinced that one needs reserves worth a year’s 
level of imports or more for this purpose.  Moreover, India’s short-term external debt 
now is only 5.4 percent of reserves.  The cost of holding reserves is the foregone 
returns relative to alternative investments—even if reserves are invested well, this 
cost is unlikely to be negligible.  In other words, even a generous allowance for the 
insurance provided by reserves would not raise the marginal returns from an extra 
dollar of reserves to the potential returns from alternative uses of resources in our 
economies.  In both our countries, fiscal deficits as a proportion of GDP are high and 
rising.  This has not resulted in rising current account deficit (on the contrary, current 
account is in surplus) or in significant inflation.  Interest rates have not risen—in 
fact, they have gone down, at least in India.  Neither India nor Pakistan are favourite 
destinations for foreign investors—a relatively small economy such as Thailand 
attracted $3.8 billion of FDI in 2001, even after undergoing a financial crisis, more 
than India’s $3.4 billion [World Bank (2003), pp. 268 and 520].  My inference from 
all these macroeconomic facts is that all is not well with the investment climate in Privatisation, Regulation, and Competition  413
our region—using Keynes’s memorable phrase, “animal spirits” seem to be 
conspicuously down. 
  The poor investment climate, in my view, reflects in large part our failure to 
sustain and deepen our economic reforms and integration with the world economy.  
It is important to recognise that privatisation opens up avenues for production 
investment by domestic and foreign investors.  Unlike Latin American countries, we 
have not used privatisation as a means to attract FDI.  A transparent and purposive 
privatisation process would help revive “animal spirits.”  Private investment would 
be attracted to labour-intensive activities in which our economies have a comparative 
advantage and would thus promote growth and alleviate poverty. Turning to 
integration with the world economy, India’s share in world exports fell from around 
2.5 percent in 1948 to a low of 0.5 percent in the early 90s.  After reforms of 1991, it 
has climbed to 0.8 percent in 2002, whereas China quadrupled its share from about 
1.25 percent in 1980 to 5.1 percent in 2002 [WTO (2003a)].  I am afraid the mindset 
of our policy-makers, bureaucrats and the elite, is ambivalent about the virtues of 
liberal foreign trade and integration with the world economy, and more generally, of 
the market mechanism.  It is well known from the Theory of the Second Best that as 
long as distortions continued to be present, reforms that otherwise would have been 
beneficial could be welfare worsening.  The fact that significant distortionary trade 
and other barriers still exist in our economy undoubtedly diminish the potential 
benefits from our economic reforms. 
The travails of our privatisation efforts, problems with the creation of 
appropriate regulatory structure, and the failure to tackle our serious governance 
problems are all reflections of the constraints of our political economy.  I do not wish 
to minimise the reforms that we have been able to put in place over the last two 
decades.  But our competitors in the developing world have gone farther than we 
have.  Unless we renew our commitment to further reforms, pursue globalisation and 
privatisation seriously, address our governance problems, prevent the dead hand of 
bureaucracy and populist politics from stifling the economy,  and above all create an 
environment in which incentives to invest in human and physical capital, innovate 
and compete are abundant, there is no hope of accelerating our rate of growth and 
sustaining it at a rapid rate for long.  And if we fail to achieve sustained and rapid 
growth, we will be failing our people by condemning them to a continuing poverty 
from which millions in East Asia and China have escaped, a failure for which history 
will not forgive us. 
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As usual, T. N. Srinivasan has produced a well-argued, logical, and 
comprehensive paper that is very difficult to take issue with. Of course, and this is 
customary for his papers. There are parts that are controversial and one can pick on 
some of the statements and arguments, but on the whole, his line of argument 
regarding privatisation and deregulation in South Asia (principally India and 
Pakistan) cannot be refuted. This places the discussant at a distinct disadvantage of 
having to look for small things to dispute and thus appearing to lose sight of the big 
picture. So let me say up-front that I agree with his central premise that the 
supposedly negative experiences of India and Pakistan with privatisation and 
deregulation should not be taken as a general indictment of these policies. The 
reform policies are still right, it was the implementation that was often flawed. 
Indeed, both countries should aim for bolder reforms if they are to get on a high 
enough growth path that will raise living standards and make a significant dent in 
poverty levels. 
My comments focus on three main issues: 
  (a)  privatisation and deregulation without an appropriate regulatory 
framework, looking particularly at the case of banks; 
  (b) estimating the effects of privatisation; and 
 (c)  liberalisation  strategies. 
 
1.  PRIVATISATION AND DEREGULATION WITHOUT AN 
APPROPRIATE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
T. N. Srinivasan says that for natural monopolies and quasi-monopolies, 
creating an appropriate regulatory framework ahead of privatisation is necessary. I 
would go further and say all types of privatisation and forms of deregulation require 
this regulatory framework. For example, take the case of banks, where having 
suitable regulations is essential. We know of the costs that banking crises in various 
countries have imposed—in the 1990s these costs amounted to an average of 10–20 
percent of GDP. In many cases, these crises can be traced directly back to earlier 
liberalisations in the absence of appropriate regulatory structures. One of the basic 
lessons of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 is that a regulatory framework is 
fundamental in any privatisation/deregulation strategy. 
There are essentially four key challenges in the design of a regulatory 
framework for banks: (a) redefining risk-based capital standards to take account of Comments 
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new financial instruments; (b) shifting the regulatory emphasis away from capital 
standards towards incentive mechanisms, the risk management processes in banks, 
and market discipline; (c) preventing regulatory “arbitrage”; and (d) taking account 
of moral hazard because consolidation of banks creates institutions that are “too big 
to fail”. 
If an appropriate regulatory framework with these types of features build in is 
absent, there will be a tendency towards banking fragility and banking crises. 
 
2.  EFFECTS OF PRIVATISATION 
There have been numerous studies, including those in Pakistan, that attempt to 
measure the effects of privatisation. I completely agree with the misgivings 
expressed by T. N. Srinivasan regarding the methodology employed to determine 
these effects. 
What is the methodology that is used? Virtually all studies use what can be 
called the “before-after” approach, where performance before privatisation is 
compared to performance after. The basic advantage of this approach is that it is easy 
to calculate. The problem, however, is that the before-after approach assumes all 
other things remain equal. It thus will not yield an estimate of the independent effects 
of privatisation when the non-privatisation determinants of outcomes change 
between the pre-privatisation and post-privatisation periods. In reality, these non-
privatisation determinants do change significantly from year to year. The obvious 
example would be the overall macroeconomic conditions in the economy. This 
means that the before-after estimation of privatisation effects will typically be biased 
and will vary over time. 
These shortcomings of the before-after approach make it a poor estimator of 
the counterfactual—what would have been the performance of the firms if there had 
been no privatisation? This approach assumes a counterfactual in which other things 
remain constant at their pre-privatisation levels. This is a heroic assumption. Of 
course, there are other approaches which do help to reduce the bias inherent in the 
before-after approach. A currently popular one is the control-group approach 
adjusted for sample selection bias and initial conditions. In many areas of economics, 
this newer approach is being used to estimate the effects of government intervention, 
and I would suggest that something like this should be used as well to estimate the 
empirical effects of privatisation. For me, as yet there is only anecdotal evidence on 
whether privatisation works or not. We need systematic empirical evidence before 
coming to a conclusion either way. 
 
3.  LIBERALISATION STRATEGIES 
I don’t believe there has been a well-thought out liberalisation strategy in 
Pakistan. What we have had are episodes of liberalisation, often in the context of Mohsin S. Khan 
 
418
IMF programmes. What has this meant? Basically, the absence of a liberalisation 
strategy has meant that sectoral liberalisations have occurred almost independently, 
and these liberalisations have been spread out over time. For example, the financial 
sector reforms were not linked to trade reforms, and neither of these were linked to 
reforms in the energy sector. Naturally, inconsistencies developed. Take the case of 
capital account liberalisation under the Nawaz Sharif government. In retrospect, it 
was a mistake as the initial conditions and appropriate regulatory structures were 
simply not there. Does it make sense to liberalise the capital account when the trade 
account is not fully open and the financial sector is not liberalised? 
Let me end by making three other points. First, T. N. Srinivasan says that 
corruption can cause serious social welfare problems in the sale of state assets. I fully 
agree but would go even further, arguing that there has been a quantum jump in 
corruption (at least in monetary terms) associated with the sale of state assets. 
Percentage commissions may still be the same, but the amounts have jumped 
sharply. There is a lot of evidence of this phenomenon from developing countries 
and transition countries. It is clear that privatisation has to proceed in the context of a 
well-defined framework for sales, with legally binding rules. 
Second, how should privatisation resources be used? There is a major debate 
going on as to whether proceeds from privatisation should go towards reducing the 
national debt or to reducing the fiscal deficit. I would favour the first, that is, 
reducing the overall government debt of the country. This would have a more 
permanent impact and lock in the current and future governments. Reducing today’s 
fiscal deficit with privatisation receipts is only a temporary policy. 
Third, should you have a single regulatory authority or several agencies 
regulating the financial sector? There is a good argument for having a single 
authority, since the coordination problem disappears by definition. But of course a 
single agency can become too powerful and you may want “competition” among the 
regulators. While this debate between those who favour a single authority and those 
who prefer multiple agencies is interesting, it misses the point in some respects. The 
basic question is: Who do regulators report to, and can they be truly independent and 
report only to the legislatures? 
In conclusion, this is an extremely interesting paper with an important policy 
message. It should be read by all reform-minded officials in South Asia. T. N. 
Srinivasan shows them the directions that they should move in, and the pitfalls that 
they should avoid. 
 
Mohsin S. Khan 
International Monetary Fund, 





It is a great pleasure to welcome Professor Srinivasan in Islamabad, and a 
privilege to be a discussant on his Mahbub ul Haq lecture. Professor Srinivasan 
wrote his PhD dissertation under Prof. Tjalling Koopmans on a two-sector optimal 
growth model which was viewed with awe and inspiration by generations of Yale 
students, especially those from the developing countries. Professor Srinivasan 
returned to India in the 1960s and engaged himself in research and debate on Indian 
planning, making outstanding contributions to the Indian planning process, which 
was in transition after the demise of India’s first Prime Minister, who was also the 
Chairman of the Planning Commission. Prof. Srinivasan’s involvement in policy 
research on India gave him a unique opportunity to study the political economy of 
Indian and other countries’ growth and helped him to become one of the foremost 
development economists in the world. 
Since his return to Yale in 1980, Professor Srinivasan has contributed vastly 
to the reputation of its Economics Department, which he headed until recently, and 
especially of its Economic Growth Centre, which he headed earlier and has been 
associated with since its inception. He uniquely combines his skills in quantitative 
economics, with his erudition in development theory and a deep knowledge of and 
insights into the problems of Asian and particularly South Asian economies, which is 
clearly evident in his lecture. The two volumes of the McGraw-Hill Handbook of 
Development Economics co-edited by him are an eloquent testimony to the breadth 
of his scholarship in a wide-ranging field. 
As a discussant of his paper, I am handicapped by the non-availability of his 
paper. In preparing my comments, I have relied mainly on the brief abstract provided 
by the organisers and on Prof. Srinivasan’s other writings in development economics. I 
will focus my comments on the first part of Professor Srinivasan’s paper which focuses 
on the comparative experience of East Asia and South Asia and of India and Pakistan, 
and then on the second part, which deals with privatisation issues. 
The broad theme of the first part of Professor Srinivasan’s paper touches upon 
a question that has intrigued development economists for a long time and continues 
to agonise the economists and policy-makers of this subcontinent. To put it bluntly: 
Why has South Asia been left behind in the development race? Or, to put it in 
another way: What went wrong with South Asia and what made East Asian 
economies become a miracle, although at the start of the development race half a 
century ago, the latter did not have a significant, if any, advantage over the former? 
Notwithstanding the prodigious efforts of economists, within and outside the World 
Bank, there I still a dearth of convincing economic explanations, although several 
political economy-nuanced stories appear to be plausible. S. M. Naseem 
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Development economists, including Professor Srinivasan, have generally 
picked two palpable primary suspects in this regard; the first being excessive import 
substitution, and the second being overzealous state intervention in economic 
activities. While there is no doubt that these two factors account for a large variation 
in the performance of the two sets of economies, they are by no means the only 
factors which have been responsible for the development lag that South Asia has 
suffered in comparison with East Asia. Indeed, it is an oversimplification to say that 
the East Asians did not indulge in import substitution—although they were certainly 
much more selective and prudent in the matter than India and Pakistan. Again many 
recent appraisals have recognised the strong role that the state has played in East 
Asia in the economic development of their countries. In South Asia, perhaps more 
conspicuously and less justifiably in India than in Pakistan, the state may have 
played a more obtrusive role in economic activities generally, though not necessarily 
in economic development. Indeed, state failure of South Asia has consisted largely of 
acts of omission than those of commission. 
The differences in the growth strategies and the performance of India and 
Pakistan referred to by Professor Srinivasan also provide considerable food for 
thought and conjecture. The dirigismic influence of the Mahalonobis model, which 
lasted for over two decades—although it could not be completely dethroned until 
much later, was replaced by the rise of populism under Mrs Gandhi and the rampant 
increase in rent-seeking behaviour that it engendered. India’s Hindu growth rate of 3 
percent per annum in the first three or four decades began to raise questions about 
the development strategy which attached priority to centralised planning, import 
substitution, and heavy industry, which were the essential features of the 
Mahalonobian scheme of things. Pakistan, on the other hand, adopted a less 
centralised approach in the beginning and chose the easy—rather than the difficult—
path of import substitution, concentrating on consumer rather than capital or 
intermediate goods. Pakistan’s strategy was facilitated by its greater access to foreign 
resources, while the Indian strategy was dictated by a much more binding foreign 
exchange constraint. However, as Professor Srinivasan rightly points out, while 
Pakistan’s economic performance until the 1980s was perceptibly better than India’s, 
it hardly matched that of East Asia. 
Indeed in the 1990s, especially after the adoption of vigorous liberalisation 
policies in India and Pakistan, spearheaded by Manmohan Singh and Sartaj Aziz, 
respectively, the ranking of the two economies was reversed. The Indian tortoise 
finally caught up with and overtook the Pakistani hare. In my view, it was not 
liberalisation—or its more effective implementation—alone which has given India 
an edge since the 1990s, but the cumulative effect of India’s slow but steady (though 
not always efficient) growth and development in many inter-related fields and 
Pakistan’s continued neglect (not always benign) of its human development and 
other structural problems. The contrast between the èlitist development ethos in Comments 
 
421
Pakistan and the middle-class pandering of Indian development strategies has also 
contributed to stronger growth in India in recent years. Both countries, however, 
have lagged far behind East Asia in their growth performance, and far behind China 
in equitable development (especially before the liberalisation era). 
A problem shared by both India and Pakistan is the colossal under-investment 
in public goods, such as education and health, which is the real government failure in 
these countries and the main reason for the continued persistence of poverty in both 
countries. The one public good on which both countries overspend is defence. It is 
pathetic to see the rulers of both these poor countries take pride in being the 
members of the exclusive nuclear club, while millions in these lands are deprived of 
the most basic needs. If they had competed in reducing poverty and providing better 
amenities for their citizens (instead of competing in producing more deadly Agnis 
and Ghouris and in terrorising the peoples of this region with an impending nuclear 
holocaust), South Asia would have been a much better, and I would say a safer, place 
to live in—and not only a place for investment by foreigners. Ironically, the other 
area in which India was criticised in the past for having overinvested, viz., higher 
education seems to have been a blessing in disguise, helping India to capitalise on 
the Information Technology (IT) boom. On the other hand, Pakistan’s fire-fighting 
efforts to compete with India in this field do not look promising because they have 
been undertaken too late and with little resources. 
The other major theme of Professor Srinivasan’s paper is privatisation. 
Professor Srinivasan believes that privatisation in South Asia needs to be 
“deepened and accelerated further”. I may agree about deepening, but I think 
accelerating the process in the current political milieu in both countries is full of 
risks; a more gradualistic and cautious approach, which seems to be the case in 
India, would be prefereable. The horror stories that one hears about the 
privatisation experienced in Pakistan, documented by Akhtar Hasan Khan (who is 
presenting a paper on the subject elsewhere in this Meeting), are enough to 
validate this note of caution. 
Indeed, I have a much more basic point on the question of privatisation which 
relates to the motivation for “privatisation” during times of financial stress. 
Privatisation by itself is not an undesirable strategy at it releases public resources for 
higher priority areas. The Chinese strategy of not undertaking new public investment 
instead of liquidating current public enterprises makes more sense. However, the 
present plans on privatisation, aptly described by some as “fire sales”, seem to be ill-
conceived and directed to serve the interests of powerful groups. In this regard, I 
would like to quote a remark by Professor James Tobin, the Yale Nobel Laureate, 
who died last year and whom both Professor Srinivasan and myself hold in the 
highest esteem as a teacher. Commenting on Reagnomics over a decade and a half 
ago, Prof. Tobin wrote: S. M. Naseem 
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“The current conservative fad is “privatisation”. The administration’s budget-
makers have hit upon sales of federal assets as a cute technical way to comply 
with Gramm-Rudman. Obviously no business accountant (except at Enron 
and WorldCom) would regard asset sales as deficit-reducing current revenue. 
But privatisation is welcome to free market ideologues any way. Although 
some privatisation may be desirable and cost-effective, current proposals 
reflect budget cosmetics and doctrinaire principle rather than case-by-case 
examinations of long-run costs and benefits”. 
I think if one substitutes the IMF-World Bank for Gramm-Rudman, the 
quotation fits the South Asian situation perfectly. 
 
S. M. Naseem 
Islamabad. 
 